Last week, the influential New England Journal of Medicine published an article by Bruce Vladek entitled "Fixing Medicare's Physician Payment System."(1)  Although only identified as working for Nexara, a health consulting business, Mr Vladek was a former administrator of what was then called the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the part of the department that then ran the US Medicare program.  Vladek thus can reasonably be viewed as an expert on Medicare. 

Vladek identified two main problems with the current way physicians are paid by Medicare.  First,

Medicare is captive to an arbitrary, if elegantly conceived, formula for total payments to physicians — the sustainable growth rate (SGR). In the alternate reality of the Congressional budget process, the SGR will reduce Medicare's physician payments, which already trail those from private insurers, as far into the future as the eye can see.

Second,

there is widespread consensus that the relative fees in the current system are a significant cause of the growing imbalance in supply and utilization between primary care and specialty services in the U.S. health care system. That imbalance, in turn, is widely perceived as a major cause of both excessive costs and inadequate quality of care. This is not just a Medicare problem: the Medicare Resource-Based Relative Value Scale is used by most private insurers to set relative prices for physicians.

Vladek expanded on the second point as follows

the basic mechanics of the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, which was supposed to change physician payment to increase rewards for primary care services at the expense of procedural and interventional services, appears to have gone totally off track. For various reasons, the fee schedule, which originally did increase the prices of evaluation and management services relative to those of surgery or invasive procedures, turned in the other direction through the process of annual updating of relative value units. Surgeons, radiologists, and some medical specialists are now paid two to three times as much per hour as providers of cognitive services, which is about where we began 20 years ago; this was the situation that the fee schedule was supposed to fix.

The question of the relative virtues of primary versus specialty care can be debated ad nauseam, but in other wealthy countries that serve their populations at least as well as we do, the ratio of primary care physicians to specialists is much higher than in the United States, and the gap in compensation is much smaller or the poles even reversed. Young physicians, burdened by increasing educational debts, may well choose a career path on the basis of a major difference in compensation, especially when the better-compensated positions require less ongoing responsibility for patients and offer better working hours.

This is about all that Vladek wrote about how the imbalance between how Medicare pays for primary care and other "cognitive services," and for procedures came about. Vladek, and many others have argued that this imbalance has lead to strong financial incentives that have been slowly destroying primary care, and strong incentives that have lead to the use of too many procedures, both strong drivers of rising costs in the most expensive health care system in the world.

Vladek noted vaguely that "through various reasons," the incentives were imbalanced by "the process of annual updating of relative value units."

However, as we have discussed in several blog posts, a lot more is known about how this process got "totally off track."

In fact, in 2007, an article by Bodenheimer et al in the Annals of Internal Medicine explained the problems in considerably more detail.(2)  As we wrote then, Its main points included

• Proceduralists are often able to learn how to do their procedures more quickly, and thus increase the volume of procedures done, while office and hospital visits can only be sped up so much.
• The process used to update the RBRVS system is biased towards procedures for three main reasons: 1. "specialty society influence in proposing RVU [relative value unit] increases," 2. the specialist-heavy RUC [Relative Value Scale Update Committee] membership," and 3. "the desire of RUC specialists to avoid increases in evaluation and management [that is, cognitive, or non-procedural] RVUs."
• Medicare now uses a formula to limit increases in overall spending. The use of this formula leads to across the board cuts in all reimbursements. Since cognitive services reimbursements were never high to begin with, and have rarely been individually increased, these cuts tend to have disproportionate decreases.
• Private insurers and managed care organizations tend to follow Medicare's lead in their reimbursement procedures, but tend to tilt the playing field even more in favor of procedures versus cognitive services. Several studies showed that such payers paid more for procedures than did Medicare, but about the same for office and hospital visits.

The role of the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) is complex and in many ways mysterious.  As we wrote before, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments. However, the identities of RUC members are opaque, and the proceedings of the group are secret.

To expand on the penultimate point, the current page on the AMA web-site that describes the RUC only lists its members in terms of their specialties and organizational affiliation.  Their names do not appear.  A response to a previous post by me on the subject by the then Chair and Chair-Elect of the RUC suggested that the RUC membership is not quite secret. They stated that "a list of the individual members of the RUC is published in the AMA publication, Medicare RBRVS 2009: The Physicians Guide." This publication is available from the AMA here for a mere $71.95. However, the book is not on the web, or in my local or university library, and I have no other way to easily access it.  Thus, the RUC membership as at best relatively opaque.

To expand on the ultimate point, as Goodson(3) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."

The fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about.  We have posted (here, here, and here) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC.  In 2010, post the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seems to remain the great unmentionable.  Even the leading US medical journal seems reluctant to even print its name. 

Thus, as we noted before, however, the mysteries about it remain:

• How did the government come to fix the payments physicians receive? Government price-fixing has not been popular in the US, yet this has caused no outcry.
• Why is the process by which they are fixed allowed to be so opaque and unaccountable? Why are there no public hearings on the updates, and why is there no input from practicing physicians or organizations other than those related to the RUC?
• How did the RUC become de facto in charge of this process?
• Why does the AMA keep the membership on the RUC so opaque, and give no input into the RUC process to its general membership?
• Why is the RUC membership so dominated by procedural specialists? Why were primary care physicians, who made up at least a sizable minority of physicians when the update process was started, not represented according to their numbers?
• Why has there been so little discussion of the RUC and its responsibility for an extremely expensive health care system dominated by high-technology, expensive, risky and invasive procedures?

Without discussing how the incentives for physicians became so unbalanced, do we really expect we can fix them?  In this case, the persistence of the anechoic effect seems to be doing real damage to the discussion of the critical issues we in the US face today.

References

1. Vladek B. Fixing Medicare's physician payment system. N Engl J Med 2010; 362:1955-1957. (Link here.)

2. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link here.)

3. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310.  (Link here.)

An odd story that appeared earlier this month linked several people we have discussed on Health Care Renewal.

On one hand, we posted about how Dr David Polly, a spine surgeon at the University of Minnesota, testified before the US Congress in support of research on treatments of bone injuries afflicting US soldiers. He did not then reveal that he had been paid more than one million dollars for consulting by Medtronic, the manufacturer of a bone growth product used to treat such injuries, also the source of payments of his expenses for the trip to Washington. At the time, we suggested this case was a reminder to be skeptical about academics who are really stealth health policy advocates for industry.

On the other hand, in a post about renewed payments by makers of artificial joints to orthopedic surgeons after the US government advocated a series of deferred prosecution agreements as a cure for such apparent conflicts of interest, we quoted Dr Charles Rosen, "Nothing will change until someone goes to jail. It’s a big game."

The link between them appeared in two related articles. First, the Minneapolis Star-Tribune reported on the appointment of another Medtronic consultant to a top leadership post in the US Department of Veterans Affairs:

In a Sept. 28 letter to Veterans Affairs Secretary Eric Shinseki, Sen. Charles Grassley asks whether Dr. Stephen Ondra's 'policy advice and decisions at the VA are vulnerable to potential conflicts of financial interest' given his prior relationship with the Fridley-based medical technology giant.

Ondra and Medtronic mutually severed their financial relationship in July 2008. But just prior to that, Medtronic paid him $3.6 million in royalties related to spine-surgery instruments, according to financial disclosure forms he submitted to the VA.

It appears that Medtronic lobbied hard for the appointment of its former consultant:

While noting that Ondra is not a Medtronic employee, Grassley characterized the surgeon's relationship with the company as 'unambiguous and substantial.' Further, Grassley notes that Ondra 'was able to penetrate the political establishment at its highest level to obtain a senior position at the VA' because of his previous ties to the company.

The details are:

Ondra's candidacy for his current post was supported by Medtronic Chief Executive William Hawkins III, who wrote a letter of recommendation to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on his behalf. This was at the suggestion of Dr. S. Ward Casscells III, who was then assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, according to a series of internal e-mails obtained by the Star Tribune.

'I have known Dr. Casscells for many years and was comfortable in approaching him on this topic,' Hawkins wrote in a Jan. 16, 2009 e-mail to the then-head of Medtronic's $3.5 billion spine device business, Steve La Neve. (La Neve left that position earlier this year in a corporate reorganization.)

La Neve replied a day later that Ondra wanted to meet with him or with Hawkins before a reference letter was sent, 'so that it can capture his work on appropriate industry-physician relationships and transparency.'

(It is not clear whether the last sentence above is meant to be an ironic pun about regulatory capture.)

A post on Pharmalot explains what Dr Ondra's first priority was once he got his government job:

Within a few days, however, Ondra objected to the proposed nomination of another spine surgeon, Charles Rosen, as US Surgeon General. Why? As founder of the Association of Medical Ethics, Rosen publicly questioned consulting ties between doctors and device makers and, for his trouble, allegedly suffered retaliation by members of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (see this). In a January 21, 2009 email exchange with Davd Polly, a University of Minnesota professor who was another Medtronic consultant, Ondra acknowledged never having heard of Rosen, but reacts viscerally to a recent story in The Orange County Register that details Rosen’s self-appointed role as a watchdog.

'Since this individual is toxic and dangerous I would leave nothing to chance,' he responds to Polly, who had forwarded the newspaper story to Ondra. Polly, by the way, is a nationally known spine surgeon who came under congressional scrutiny for his work several years ago for the device maker, something that Rosen had criticized (look here). 'This moment in history is too important to our country to let such a disreputable and dangerous person continue his self-promotion crusade,' Ondra continues. 'I would encourage you and any other physicians and citizens to weigh in on this to HHS and public health.'

Got that? Medtronic pays Dr Ondra millions. Medtronic pushes for Dr Ondra's appointment to a top VA leadership position. Once in that position, Dr Ondra confers with another million dollar Medtronic consultant, and then works to block the appointment as Surgeon General of a known foe of the cozy web of conflicts of interest that afflicts medicine. Thus do conflicts of interest work to promote the capture of government by special interests.

The Pharmalot post concluded with this opinion:

'It’s obvious that Dr. Ondra benefited from his relationship with Medtronic. And since he worked to kill off the nomination of Chuck Rosen, Medtronic’s main critic, I can see how Medtronic benefited from Dr. Ondra,' says Paul Thacker, a former Grassley staff investigator and US Army specialist. 'What I don’t understand is how I and other veterans have benefited from all this back-door dealing. What’s in it for us?'

That is a good question. It appears that nothing was in it for veterans, or the US public. But everything was in it for Medtronic and the doctors it pays so well. I would submit that it is the readiness of big health care corporations to create conflicts of interest that seduce physicians to put their loyalties to their corporate sponsors ahead of the public interest that is toxic and dangerous.

This convoluted story suggests the urgent need for full disclosure of all relationships between physicians and others who make decisions and wield influence in health care on one hand, and health care organizations on the other hand. If physicians want their health policy efforts to be met with anything other than guffaws and cynical eye rolls, they need to seriously consider swearing off the sorts of cushy corporate relationships that Dr Ondra and Dr Polly embraced.