Some of the US most prestigious academic medical centers have been receiving unusual scrutiny lately.

Mount Sinai Medical Center and New York - Presbyterian Hospital.

As reported first by the Wall Street Journal,

Federal prosecutors are investigating allegations that bid rigging and fraud at Mount Sinai Medical Center and New York-Presbyterian Hospital resulted in the hospitals awarding contracts worth tens of millions of dollars to outside contractors.

Purchasing officials at the hospitals, two of the city's largest and most prestigious, are alleged to have gotten more than a million dollars in payments from companies that were then given lucrative contracts to perform work such as re-insulating pipes and removing asbestos, according to documents filed in the Southern District of New York.

Nine contractors are involved in the case. So far, eight people and three companies supplying the hospitals have pleaded guilty to charges including bid-rigging, mail fraud and tax fraud. Three more people have been indicted on similar charges.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Internal Revenue Service have been investigating and the Justice Department's Antitrust Division is prosecuting the allegations in the case.

Some relevant specifics:

The most recent indictment, handed up by a federal grand jury April 6, involved the alleged awarding of more than $195,000 in maintenance and insulation contracts. Mario Perciavalle, associate director of plant services at Mount Sinai, is accused of taking at least $20,500 in cash from a Long Island City company in 2004 and 2005 in exchange for the company, unnamed in documents, winning the deals.

Prosecutors also are pursuing a case involving a former official at New York-Presbyterian, Salvatore Scotto-DiVetta, a supervisor at the hospital's Facilities Operations department. He pleaded guilty in March to rigging bids for re-insulation contracts, the Department of Justice said.

The next day, the Journal reported:

Two New York-Presbyterian Hospital officials and two contractors who did business with the prestigious hospital were indicted on fraud charges Tuesday in the latest cases stemming from a federal investigation into bid-rigging and fraud.

The indictment alleges that the hospital officials—Santo Saglimbeni of Armonk, N.Y., and Emilio Figueroa, whose hometown wasn't given—received payments and gifts in exchange for awarding contracts to certain companies.

And already the box score for this investigation increased:

As a result of the investigation, a total of five hospital employees, 10 people outside the hospitals and six companies have either pleaded guilty or face charges.

The comments by hospital officials had a familiar ring to anyone who has been following the hearings in Washington on the global financial collapse. From the first article:

A Mount Sinai spokesman said the hospital notified the Justice Department 'about the possibility of impropriety immediately after it was identified in an internal audit' and is cooperating with the investigation. The spokesman said the hospital dismissed the employee under investigation and instituted tougher contracting systems.

From the second:

New York-Presbyterian was an 'unknowing victim of these alleged crimes,' a hospital spokeswoman said. She also said that the staffers named in the indictment no longer work at the hospital, and it is cooperating with the investigation.

Partners Healthcare System

Just out today in the Boston Globe:

The US Department of Justice has opened a civil investigation into possible anticompetitive behavior by Partners HealthCare System Inc., the region’s most powerful hospital and physician network.

In a letter sent to Partners and the state’s three largest health insurers on April 19, investigators from the Justice Department’s antitrust division demanded documents relating to Partners’ 'contracting and other practices in health care markets in Eastern Massachusetts.'

The letter, obtained by the Globe, said the probe sought to determine whether the practices violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, which bars companies from using their market power to limit trade or artificially raise prices.

The background is:

Boston-based Partners has been under growing scrutiny because of its market power and ability to draw high prices from insurers. The company employs about 5,500 physicians and operates a half dozen smaller hospitals, in addition to their prestigious Harvard-affiliated Boston teaching hospitals, Mass. General and the Brigham.

Earlier this year, Attorney General Martha Coakley issued a report documenting that Massachusetts insurance companies pay some hospitals and doctors, including those in the Partners network, twice as much money as others for essentially the same patient care. The report pointed to the market clout of the best-paid providers as a main driver of the state’s spiraling health care costs.

A 2008 Globe Spotlight Team series focused on the Boston market found that hospitals such as Mass. General and the Brigham typically are paid 15 to 60 percent more for essentially the same work as other hospitals.

Soon after that series, Coakley launched her investigation into whether Partners and Blue Cross-Blue Shield, the state’s largest health insurer, may have illegally colluded to increase the price of health insurance statewide over the last decade, according to several legal and government sources.

And again, the official response had a familiarly evasive ring:

Partners spokesman Rich Copp yesterday noted that the hospital network already has supplied similar information to investigators from the state attorney general’s office, which launched its own review of Partners’ contracting practices last year. He noted in Partners’ defense that it vies with other providers in the area’s 'highly competitive' health care market.

'The Department of Justice has requested the same information that we have provided to the attorney general’s office,' said Copp. 'We will continue to cooperate with both government agencies during this ongoing analysis of health care in Massachusetts.'

Summary

So there it is.  Multiple indictments for and guilty pleas to charges of bid-rigging and fraud at two New York academic medical centers, and state collusion and federal anti-trust investigations of a Massachusetts hospital system.  The issues involve four of the most prestigious teaching hospitals in the US.

Of course, not all the indictments may result in convictions, and the investigations may not result in charges.  But this involves some institutions that at one time would have appeared beyond reproach.  The lack of clear denials from the inevitable official spokespeople, and attempts to deny responsibility for the actions of employees elsewhere identified as "officials" do not provide much reassurance.

Of course, readers of Health Care Renewal would have known that questions could be raised about leadership and governance of these once-revered institutions.  Questions could be raised about the incentives implied by the huge compensation given to the top hired executives at New York - Presbyterian, awarded by a board of trustees that includes some of the leaders of the more prominent failed finance corporations involved in the global financial collapse.  Questions could be raised about the dominant presence of finance leaders and possibly conflicted individuals on the Partners board, and apparent interlocks among Partners leadership and the leadership of the largest health insurer in Massachusetts, which was willing to pay that system so much.

Maybe, instead of lecturing the more lowly among us about our responsibilities to improve health care, the leaders of our previously most august health care institutions need to introspect more about their own responsibility to address the metastasis of "greed and incompetence" in health care from the financial sector.

In his recent review of Dr Ezekiel Emanuel's book, (Healthcare, Guaranteed: A Simple, Secure Solution for America,) Dr Arnold Relman, Editor-Emeritus of the New England Journal of Medicine, discussed the history of the deprofessionalization of American physicians.

The behavior of US physicians has been changed by the commercialization of medical care, and this too has increased costs. US medical practice has traditionally relied on fee-for-service, which has always given it some of the attributes and incentives of a business. However, the American Medical Association (AMA) maintained for many years that medical practice was a profession, not a business. The AMA's ethical guidelines therefore advised physicians to limit their income to reasonable earnings from the care of patients, and to refrain from advertising and from entering financial arrangements with drug and device manufacturers. Those restrictions were lifted after the US Supreme Court decided in 1975 that lawyers, and by extension members of other professions, including physicians, are engaged in interstate commerce and therefore must be subject to antitrust law (from which they had largely been exempt).(1)

This decision had an enormous effect on the medical profession, but its consequences have received relatively little public attention. Although the courts did not initiate the commercialization of medicine, they certainly accelerated it and gave it legal justification. In 1980, after medical organizations lost some costly antitrust trials, in which they were accused of such offenses as limiting doctor fees or denying staff privileges, the AMA changed its ethical guidelines, declaring medicine to be both a business and a profession. This lowered the AMA's barriers to the commercialization of medical practice, allowing physicians to participate in any legal profit-making business arrangement that did not harm patients.

Nearly a half-century ago, Stanford economics professor Kenneth Arrow, later a Nobel laureate, convincingly argued that medical care cannot conform to market laws because patients are not ordinary consumers and doctors are not ordinary vendors. He said that sick or injured patients must rely on physicians in ways fundamentally different from the price-driven relation between buyers and sellers in an ordinary market. This argument implied that, contrary to the assumptions of antitrust law, market competition among physicians cannot be expected to lower medical prices. And since physicians influence decisions to use medical services far more than patients do, the volume and types of services provided to patients—and hence total health costs—need to be controlled by forces other than the market, such as professional standards and government regulation. But Arrow's argument was largely ignored in the rush to exploit health care for commercial purposes that ensued after the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.(2)

Writing about the decline of physicians' professionalism in 2007 [ Relman AS. Medical professionalism in a commercialized health care market. JAMA 2007; 298: 2668-2670. [link here) ], Dr Relman had briefly alluded to the effect of the 1975 Supreme Court decision, (see our post here):

The law also has played a major role in the decline of medical professionalism. The 1975 Supreme Court ruling that the professions were not protected from anti-trust law undermined the traditional restraint that medical professional societies had always placed on the commercial behavior of physicians, such as advertising and investing in the products they prescribe or facilities they recommend. Having lost some initial legal battles and fearing the financial costs of losing more, organized medicine now hesitates to require physicians to behave differently from business people. It asks only that physicians' business activities should be legal, disclosed to patients, and not inconsistent with patients' interests. Until forced by anti-trust concerns to change its ethical code in 1980, the American Medical Association had held that 'in the practice of medicine a physician should limit the source of his professional income to medical services actually rendered by him, or under his supervision, to his patients' and that 'the practice of medicine should not be commercialized, nor treated as a commodity in trade.' These sentiments reflecting the spirit of professionalism are now gone.

It seems to me that Dr Relman has elucidated one of the "missing links" that help explain the current sorry state of physicians' core values, and the broader continuing health care crisis. I am amazed that this bit of history seems to have been so thoroughly forgotten. Dr Relman did write about it before 2007, but in publications that few physicians and other health care professionals were likely to see. Other than Dr Relman, almost no one writing in the medical and health care literature seems to have interest in this issue. (It has been discussed in the Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, and the Stanford Law Review by M. Gregg Bloche, but these unfortunately also could have easily been missed by nearly all physicians and health care professionals.) So we have another example of the anechoic effect.

Yet in my humble opinion, every physician and health care professional ought to know that the profession once foreswore the commercialization of medical practice, but gave up on its ability to police its own conflicts of interest after the US Supreme Court decided that professionals are subject to anti-trust law.

But knowing this important bit of history raises more questions than it answers:

• The Supreme Court decision apparently involved interpretation of law, not the constitution. Therefore, why didn't organized medicine pursue a change in the law that would allow physicians to continue to enforce their traditional professional values?
• The Supreme Court decision was primarily directed at lawyers, not physicians. Since the decision, to my knowledge, the law profession has maintained strict rules about conflicts of interest. (For example, no legal CME is sponsored by corporations whose products they seek to have the attendees favor.) Why did the decision wreck physicians' but not lawyers' abilities to regulate their own conflicts of interest?
• The Supreme Court decision only affects US law. Why have physicians in other countries also abandoned their traditional values about commercial entanglements?
• Why did this application of US antitrust law have such significant effects during an era when antitrust enforcement in health care was generally declining? (Insurance companies and hospitals that dominate local markets have not feared antitrust enforcement.)
• Why did only Dr Relman and Prof Bloche seem to care about this up to now?

Inquiring minds want to know.... And answering these questions might bring us back on the path of true medical professionalism.

Hat tip to Merrill Goozner in the GoozNews blog.

References (from Relman)

1. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).

2. Kenneth J. Arrow, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care," The American Economic Review, Vol. 53, No. 5 (December 1963).